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(2008) Synthese 160 (2).
Same old, same old
the same-order representation theory of consciousness and the division of phenomenal labor
Josh Weisberg
pp. 161-181
The same-order representation theory of consciousness holds that conscious mental states represent both the world and themselves. This complex representational structure is posited in part to avoid a powerful objection to the more traditional higher-order representation theory of consciousness. The objection contends that the higher-order theory fails to account for the intimate relationship that holds between conscious states and our awareness of them–the theory ‘divides the phenomenal labor’ in an illicit fashion. This ‘failure of intimacy’ is exposed by the possibility of misrepresentation by higher-order states. In this paper, I argue that despite appearances, the same-order theory fails to avoid the objection, and thus also has troubles with intimacy.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-006-9106-0
Full citation:
Weisberg, J. (2008). Same old, same old: the same-order representation theory of consciousness and the division of phenomenal labor. Synthese 160 (2), pp. 161-181.
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