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(2008) Synthese 160 (2).
I maintain, in defending “thirdism,” that Sleeping Beauty should do Bayesian updating after assigning the “preliminary probability” 1/4 to the statement S: “Today is Tuesday and the coin flip is heads.” (This preliminary probability obtains relative to a specific proper subset I of her available information.) Pust objects that her preliminary probability for S is really zero, because she could not be in an epistemic situation in which S is true. I reply that the impossibility of being in such an epistemic situation is irrelevant, because relative to I, statement S nonetheless has degree of evidential support 1/4.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-006-9121-1
Full citation:
Horgan, T. (2008). Synchronic bayesian updating and the sleeping beauty problem: reply to Pust. Synthese 160 (2), pp. 155-159.
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