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(2008) Synthese 164 (1).
Various formally valid counterexamples have been adduced against the Humean dictum that one cannot derive an “ought” from an “is.” There are formal rebuttals—some very sophisticated now (e.g., Charles R. Pigden’s and Gerhard Schurz’s)—to such counterexamples. But what follows is an intuitive and informal argument against them. I maintain that it is better than these sophisticated formal defenses of the Humean dictum and that it also helps us see why it implausible to think that we can be as decisive about the truth or falsity of the dictum as both the formal counterexamples or formal barriers to them purport to be.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-007-9215-4
Full citation:
Guevara, D. (2008). Rebutting formally valid counterexamples to the Humean "is-ought" dictum. Synthese 164 (1), pp. 45-60.
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