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(1998) Grazer Philosophische Studien 55.
In Michael Dummett's celebrated essay on Gödel's theorem he considers the threat posed by the theorem to the idea that meaning is use and argues that this threat can be annulled. In my essay I try to show that the threat is even less serious than Dummett makes it out to be. Dummett argues, in effect, that Gödel's theorem does not prevent us from "capturing" the truths of arithmetic; I argue that the idea that meaning is use does not require that we be able to "capture" these truths anyway. Towards the end of my essay I relate what I have been arguing first to Dummett's concept of indefinite extensibility and then to some of Wittgenstein's remarks on Gödel's theorem.
Publication details
DOI: 10.5840/gps19985516
Full citation:
Moore, A. W. (1998). More on "the philosophical significance of Gödel's theorem". Grazer Philosophische Studien 55, pp. 103-126.
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