Understanding the relationship between the felt and the measured phenomenon; what has been called the explanatory gap, or the hard problem is the crux of the cognitive scientific project. Due to its appeal to first-personal experience, phenomenology is often taken to be a promising interlocutor, but it is those very same features that seem to put it at odds with regards to the standards of scientific practice. Existing projects to naturalize phenomenology often seem to mistake for and reduce phenomenology to descriptive experiential reports that are given a merely complementary or illustrative role in the empirical endeavor. In my talk, I want to return to the premises at the heart of the explanatory gap on the one hand and the premises of the phenomenological project according to Husserl’s Krisis on the other hand. The goal is to re-evaluate what conditions need to be met for a meaningful application of phenomenological insight in the cognitive sciences to form an argument against naturalization and strengthen the argument for frontloading phenomenology instead.