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I experience some difficulty in commenting on this paper, because Hintikka has approached intentional concepts in a manner so different from my own. He has, for instance, connected the directedness of a conscious intention with something purposive, since one of the common meanings of "direction', as is the ordinary sense of "intention', is undoubtedly connected with purpose. To what are all these acts and utterances directed?' often means "What are you trying to achieve by these acts and utterances?' Now I would be infinitely far from denying that all conscious intentions are pervaded by purpose: to have something before us as the object of our awareness is certainly to try to keep it in consciousness, to try to envisage it from various aspects, to try to see it in varying contexts, some actual and possible, to compare it with other possibilities, and finally to imagine or perceive it rather than merely to think of it. But the purposive conation which inspires and sustains conscious intentionality is distinct from the conscious intentionality that it sustains : the former is consummated only in a sequence of conscious intentions, the latter is whole and complete in each conscious intention. Conscious intentionality is simply the "thereness' or Vorhandenheit of something for consciousness: though it is sustained by purpose, it is in itself utterly disparate from anything purposive or conative. It is the unique givenness of something to consciousness, its appearance in the light of consciousness, and this is the same whether what is thus apparent is perceived or thought of. The possible criminality of the Empress Agrippina may be as much vorhanden to consciousness as the telephone on my desk. I do not know whether Hintikka clearly differentiates this kind of pure cognitive appearance in his experience: it has eluded many, as for instance Heidegger. I think, however, that it is basic to the understanding of intentionality.

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-1823-4_5

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