Logical intention and comparative principles of empirical logic
pp. 209-224
Abstrakt
In this paper I shall offer a connected set of notions by which Peirce's vague notion of logical intention may be freed from its context of willfulness by connecting it instead with the representation-talk of our time. I shall do this by viewing logical categories and the expressions ("particles") they stand for, as representamens of most general and fundamental logical intentions. I shall name these fundamental logical intentions representational functions.
Publication details
Published in:
Debrock Guy, Hulswit Menno (1994) Living doubt: essays concerning the epistemology of Charles Sanders Peirce. Dordrecht, Springer.
Seiten: 209-224
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-015-8252-0_20
Referenz:
Barth E. M. (1994) „Logical intention and comparative principles of empirical logic“, In: G. Debrock & M. Hulswit (eds.), Living doubt, Dordrecht, Springer, 209–224.