Repository | Book | Chapter
(1995) Wittgenstein, Dordrecht, Springer.
My theory [...] is that bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion. Common-sense says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep; we meet a bear, are frightened and run; we are insulted by a rival, are angry and strike. The hypothesis here to be defended says that this order of sequence is incorrect, that the one mental state is not immediately induced by the other, that the bodily manifestations must first be interposed between, and that the more rational statement is that we feel sorry because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because we tremble, and not that we cry, strike, or tremble because we are sorry, angry, or fearful, as the case may be.1
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-017-3691-6_19
Full citation:
Schulte, J. (1995)., Emotion: remarks on Wittgenstein and William James, in R. Egidi (ed.), Wittgenstein, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 249-262.
This document is unfortunately not available for download at the moment.