Appreciation and criticism of Reichenbach's meta-ethics
Achilles' heel of the system?
pp. 721-730
Abstrakt
Non-cognitivism in ethics is strictly entailed by Reichenbach's epistemology. Having settled for a functional conception of knowledge, with prediction as the one and only function or purpose of knowledge, Reichenbach was committed to ethical non-cognitivism, i.e. to the view that there is no normative or prescriptive knowledge, that there are no moral truths, that moral judgements are neither true nor false.
Publication details
Published in:
Salmon Wesley C. (1979) Hans Reichenbach: logical empiricist. Dordrecht, Springer.
Seiten: 721-730
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-9404-1_25
Referenz:
Schuster Cynthia (1979) „Appreciation and criticism of Reichenbach's meta-ethics: Achilles' heel of the system?“, In: W. C. Salmon (ed.), Hans Reichenbach, Dordrecht, Springer, 721–730.