Buch | Kapitel
Hermann Weyl and "first philosophy"
constituting gauge invariance
pp. 279-298
Abstrakt
The current vogue of naturalism – whether of a pragmatist, instrumentalist or realist variety – in philosophy of physics is largely attributable to a fiction promulgated by logical empiricism, but surviving the latter's demise. It states that relatively theory (especially general relativity) comprised a decisive refutation of Kant, and transcendental idealism more broadly. A closer look at the early years of general relativity reveals a considerably different picture. Here we trace how transcendental idealism informed Weyl's construction of a "purely infinitesimal geometry" whose additional (gauge) degrees of freedom enabled incorporation of electromagnetism into the spacetime metric.
Publication details
Published in:
Bitbol Michel, Kerszberg Pierre, Petitot Jean (2009) Constituting objectivity: transcendental perspectives on modern physics. Dordrecht, Springer.
Seiten: 279-298
DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4020-9510-8_17
Referenz:
Ryckman Thomas (2009) „Hermann Weyl and "first philosophy": constituting gauge invariance“, In: M. Bitbol, P. Kerszberg & J. Petitot (eds.), Constituting objectivity, Dordrecht, Springer, 279–298.