Zeitschrift | Band | Artikel
Das "Ich" als "Alibi der Wahrheit" bei Jacques Lacan
Zum Verhältnis von Cogito und Begehren in der Psychoanalyse
pp. n/a
Abstrakt
In Lacan’s perspective, the cogito is unable to account for the separation between desire and language for the individual. The fundamental difference pertaining to the signifier (signifiant) makes it impossible for the enunciation (sum) to ever coincide with what is enunciated (sense). Therefore no final knowledge of self, being and reality (réel) is possible within the framework of the imaginary-symbolic life-world. This analysis, which is decisive for the therapeutic process, is then confronted with a radical-phenomenological critique that questions Lacan’s presuppositions about alterity from the perspective of a primal and transcendental life (Lebendigkeit), a confrontation that ought to bear fruit for the dialog between psychoanalysis and phenomenology.
Publication details
Published in:
Ferencz-Flatz Christian, Staiti Andrea (2018) The promise of genetic phenomenology. Studia Phaenomenologica 18.
Referenz:
Kühn Rolf (2018) „Das "Ich" als "Alibi der Wahrheit" bei Jacques Lacan: Zum Verhältnis von Cogito und Begehren in der Psychoanalyse“. Studia Phaenomenologica 18, n/a.