Harrison Hall
The epistemological significance of Husserl's theory of intentionality
1996
in: Phenomenology and skepticism, Evanston, Ill. : Northwestern University Press
Husserl's realism and idealism
1989
in: Husserl's phenomenology, Washington DC : University Press of America
1989
in: American phenomenology, Dordrecht : Kluwer
Naturalism, schemas, and the real philosophical issues in contemporary cognitive science
1988
in: Perspectives on mind, Dordrecht : Springer
Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of mind
1983
in: Philosophy of Mind/Philosophie de l’esprit, Dordrecht : Springer
1982
in: Husserl, intentionality and cognitive science, Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press
The philosophical significance of Husserl's theory of intentionality
1982
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 13
Was Husserl a realist or an idealist?
1982
in: Husserl, intentionality and cognitive science, Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press
Was Husserl a realist or an idealist?
1982
in: Husserl, intentionality and cognitive science, Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press
The other minds problem in early Heidegger
1980
Human Studies 3/1
Intersubjective phenomenology and Husserl's cartesianism
1979
Man and World 12/1
The continuity of Merleau-Ponty's philosophy of perception
1977
Man and World 10/4
Idealism and solipsism in Husserl's Cartesian meditations
1970
Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology 1/1