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(2012) Social injustice, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.
In Chapters 9 and 10, I argued that social injustice thrives where liberal democracy is weakest.1 Notwithstanding this endorsement, it would be a mistake to be complacent, and assume that liberal democracies are immune from social injustice. Elections perform a cardinal role in any liberal democracy, and yet paradoxically this is precisely an area where we must look for potential encroachments of social injustice. In this chapter I will be asking a very specific question: why do people vote? Or, is the act of voting immune from issues of social injustice?
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Bufacchi, V. (2012). Voting, rationality, and reputation, in Social injustice, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 136-151.
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