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(2012) Social injustice, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.
In their critical comments to my essay on "Sceptical Democracy" (Chapter 9), Matthew Festenstein (2002) and Eddie Hyland (2003) raise a number of penetrating objections that, for better or worst, demand careful scrutiny. For this, I am profoundly grateful to Festenstein and Hyland, even though I suspect that my response will not appease my critics. In what follows I will focus exclusively on two issues: first, to what extent is political scepticism different from fallibilism? Second, what is the relationship between political scepticism and moral autonomy?
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Bufacchi, V. (2012). Political scepticism: a reply to the critics, in Social injustice, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 131-135.
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