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(2000) Synthese 124 (3).

How philosophy lost perceptual expertise

Joel Richeimer

pp. 385-406

If we think of perceptual expertise, we might think ofa neurologist interpreting a CAT scan or an astronomerlooking at a star. But perceptual expertise is notlimited to ‘experts’. Perceptual expertise is atthe heart of our everyday competence in the world. Wenavigate around obstacles, we take turns inconversations, we make left-turns in face of on-comingtraffic. Each of us is a perceptual expert (thoughonly in certain domains). If we misunderstandperceptual expertise, we risk misunderstanding ourepistemic relationship to the world. I argue that thestandard arguments for the received view of perceptualexpertise are problematic at best. Of course, theissue of whether the received view is actually correctis an empirical issue. But the decision to adopt thereceived view, I argue, was not a scientific decision,but was made by inheriting a philosophical tradition– which many philosophers today would question.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1023/A:1005247308438

Full citation:

Richeimer, J. (2000). How philosophy lost perceptual expertise. Synthese 124 (3), pp. 385-406.

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