(2017) Husserl Studies 33 (3).

Husserls Evidenzbegriff in der intersubjektiven Bewährung moralischer Evidenzen

Tammo Mintken

pp. 259-285

Evidence is a central theme in Husserl´s transcendental phenomenology. This article investigates not only the theoretical aspects of evidence, but also tries to develop prolegomena for a phenomenological theory of moral evidence and moral truth. Nevertheless, this endeavor is based upon the theoretical insights of Husserl: the importance of intersubjectivity and the relevance of time, which are reviewed in the first two chapters. The temporal aspect, under the title of perpetuation (Bewährung), is crucial for the understanding of the concept of evidence. But it becomes even more important when the question of moral truth is considered. Perpetuation is not only stressed in the understanding of values, but also in the unanimity (Einstimmigkeit) of the ethical and loving person. As evidence of any kind can only be falsified by a higher evidence of the same character, moral evidence cannot be understood isolated from the living process of any prefigured moral settings of a society, moral evidence can give itself only in an interpersonal community and its moral tradition and demands the community’s own readiness for a critical habituality.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/s10743-017-9211-6

Full citation:

Mintken, T. (2017). Husserls Evidenzbegriff in der intersubjektiven Bewährung moralischer Evidenzen. Husserl Studies 33 (3), pp. 259-285.

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