(2013) Husserl Studies 29 (3).

The phenomenologizing of primal-phenomenality

Husserl and the boundaries of the phenomenology of time

Luis Niel

pp. 211-230

This paper focuses on the methodical disclosure of the lowest level of the constitution of time in Husserl's phenomenology of time (especially in the C-Manuscripts), following this leading question: is it at all possible to disclose phenomenologically the primal-phenomenal constituting stream of consciousness? First, I address the different levels of constitution in order to focus on the ultimate level. Second, I analyse the "intentionality" of the primal-stream, by means of differentiating it from act-intentionality. Third, I outline the methodical function of the reduction and of the phenomenologizing ego. Fourth, I present Abbau as the methodical possibility of reaching primal-phenomenality. Fifth, I address the problem of grasping the primal-phenomenal dimension in its originality. I will argue that we can grasp this fundamental dimension by means of a "phenomenological deconstruction" of constituted experience and at the same time by putting this dimension in an intentional relationship with the phenomenologizing ego.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/s10743-013-9134-9

Full citation:

Niel, L. (2013). The phenomenologizing of primal-phenomenality: Husserl and the boundaries of the phenomenology of time. Husserl Studies 29 (3), pp. 211-230.

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