235867

(2012) Synthese 184 (1).

A case of confusing probability and confirmation

Jeanne Peijnenburg

pp. 101-107

Tom Stoneham put forward an argument purporting to show that coherentists are, under certain conditions, committed to the conjunction fallacy. Stoneham considers this argument a reductio ad absurdum of any coherence theory of justification. I argue that Stoneham neglects the distinction between degrees of confirmation and degrees of probability. Once the distinction is in place, it becomes clear that no conjunction fallacy has been committed.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/s11229-009-9692-8

Full citation:

Peijnenburg, J. (2012). A case of confusing probability and confirmation. Synthese 184 (1), pp. 101-107.

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