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(2017) Synthese 194 (8).
After a period of inactivity, interest in explanationism as a thesis about the nature of epistemic justification has been renewed. Poston (Reason and explanation: a defense of explanatory coherentism, 2014) and McCain (Evidentialism and epistemic justification 2014; Erkenntnis 79:99–109, 2014) have both recently offered versions of explanationist evidentialism. In this paper, we pose two objections to explanationist evidentialism. First, explanationist evidentialism fails to state a sufficient condition for justification. Second, explanationist evidentialism implies a vicious regress.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11229-016-1093-1
Full citation:
Appley, B. C. , Stoutenburg, G. (2017). Two new objections to explanationism. Synthese 194 (8), pp. 3069-3084.
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