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Given a few assumptions, the probability of a conjunction is raised, and the probability of its negation is lowered, by conditionalising upon one of the conjuncts. This simple result appears to bring Bayesian confirmation theory into tension with the prominent dogmatist view of perceptual justification—a tension often portrayed as a kind of ‘Bayesian objection’ to dogmatism. In a recent paper, David Jehle and Brian Weatherson observe that, while this crucial result holds within classical probability theory, it fails within intuitionistic probability theory. They conclude that the dogmatist who is willing to take intuitionistic logic seriously can make a convincing reply to the Bayesian objection. In this paper, I argue that this conclusion is premature—the Bayesian objection can survive the transition from classical to intuitionistic probability, albeit in a slightly altered form. I shall conclude with some general thoughts about what the Bayesian objection to dogmatism does and doesn’t show.

DOI: 10.1007/s11229-016-1120-2

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