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(2018) Epistemic relativism and scepticism, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.
This chapter delineates the limits of the dialectical argument against epistemic relativism. In particular, the argument is not a response to Pyrrhonian scepticism, nor is it a response to the underdetermination and semantic arguments for epistemic relativism. If it succeeds only in undermining the principal argument for epistemic relativism, then it will have done its job.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-94673-3_10
Full citation:
Bland, S. (2018). Conclusions, in Epistemic relativism and scepticism, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 215-218.
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