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(2011) Psychology as a moral science, Dordrecht, Springer.

Changing psychologies, subjectivities, and moralities

Svend Brinkmann

pp. 39-56

That the ontology of the human being is historical has been claimed for many years by various strands of philosophy and social science. The historical nature of human self-interpretation plays a key role in interpretative or hermeneutic theory (Taylor, 1989), which finds some of its most important roots in Heidegger's ­analytic of Dasein (Heidegger, 1927). That the development of humanity should be seen as a shifting series of interpretations is also claimed by poststructuralists, particularly those influenced by the works of Foucault (1993). Both of these modes of thought and their relevance for psychology will be addressed in greater detail in the Chap. 4. In addition, historical materialists have long argued that the human being is a historical creature, whose ideas are inevitably shaped by the prevailing economic conditions. Marx himself argued that "the history of industry and industry as it objectively exists is an open book of the human faculties, which can be sensuously apprehended" (Marx, 1964:163). He further found that "No psychology for which this book, i.e., the most tangible and accessible part of history, remains closed can become a real science with a genuine content" (p. 164).

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4419-7067-1_3

Full citation:

Brinkmann, S. (2011). Changing psychologies, subjectivities, and moralities, in Psychology as a moral science, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 39-56.

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