Hegel's metaphysics, or the categorial approach to knowledge of experience
The modest aim of this discussion of Hegel's metaphysics is to indicate what the view is and to say something about its interest today. It has been claimed that metaphysics is the main problem in comprehending and evaluating Hegel's theory (, p. 3). Yet it has been widely rumored for some time that, if not philosophy, at least metaphysics has now come to the end, or perhaps even the end of the end, which is not to be confused with a new beginning. Certainly, metaphysics has lately been an unpopular theme. In our time, numerous writers from all sides of the discussion have suggested that metaphysics cannot be defended. So it is important to take stock, at least as concerns Hegel, of where things stand, in particular to determine whether, since Hegel is obviously committed to metaphysics, it makes sense to defend anything like a Hegelian view of metaphysics.
Full citation [Harvard style]:
Rockmore, T. (1994)., Hegel's metaphysics, or the categorial approach to knowledge of experience, in T. Engelhardt & T. Pinkard (eds.), Hegel reconsidered, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 43-56.
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