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(2018) Ethics without self, Dharma without atman, Dordrecht, Springer.

Detachment in Buddhist and stoic ethics

ataraxia and apatheia and equanimity

Emily McRae

pp. 73-89

Both Stoic and Buddhist ethics are deeply concerned with the ethical dangers of attachment, including (i) the destructive consequences of overwhelming emotionality, brought on by attachment, both for oneself and others, (ii) the dangers to one's agency posed by strongly held, but ultimately unstable, attachments, and (iii) the threat to virtuous emotional engagement with others caused by one's own attachment to them. The first two kinds of moral danger – overwhelming emotionality and threatened agency – have informed Stoic models of detachment, as illustrated in their concepts of ataraxia (freedom from disturbance) and apatheia (freedom from strong emotionality). In this paper I draw on Buddhist texts to present a third model of detachment, which responds primarily to the third moral danger of attachment, the danger of not loving well. On this model, detachment enables and enhances proper love and compassion and is conceived of as a tool for virtuous emotional engagement. This model challenges some influential interpretations of Buddhist conceptions of detachment that reduce them to one of the Stoic models, either the extirpation of emotions or resilience to threat to agency.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-67407-0_3

Full citation:

McRae, E. (2018)., Detachment in Buddhist and stoic ethics: ataraxia and apatheia and equanimity, in G. F. Davis (ed.), Ethics without self, Dharma without atman, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 73-89.

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