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What I wish to open up is a sub-problem of the problem of rationality. Most of us who think of ourselves as rational men would like to be able to give reasonable reasons for the things we believe. What is much less explored is the opposite problem, regarding the things we do not believe, of being able to find reasonable reasons against the things we disbelieve. This problem, arises because so many systems of philosophy are put on the shelf without being firmly refuted. Consider, for example, the system of Spinoza or of Berkeley or of Kant. It is the dominant outlook in the Anglo-American philosophical world, to regard most of these philosophies as outdated, and as saying very little that can be taken seriously. There may be justice in this view: quite possibly there are very few living issues in many of these philosophers. But one must take them, seriously if for no other reason than that there is no standard refutation of them. But if you look back on attempts to discuss historical philosophies, it is extraordinary how little agreement there is to be found on what is wrong with them. We all know that there is no agreement about positive contributions to philosophy, but there is equally little agreement on what shall be rejected and how. It seems to me very curious that there should, be no way of settling these matters. In view of this I have cast around for various methods by which metaphysical views, if they should be false, might be rejected.

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-3378-7_18

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