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From Hegel to Engels, Sartre and Ruyer (Ruyer, Revue Philosophique 116(7–8):28–49, 1933), to name only a few, materialism is viewed as a necropolis, or the metaphysics befitting such an abode; many speak of matter's crudeness, bruteness, coldness or stupidity. Science or scientism, on this view, reduces the living world to "dead matter", "brutish", "mechanical, lifeless matter", thereby also stripping it of its freedom (Crocker LG, An age of crisis, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1959). Materialism is often wrongly presented as "mechanistic materialism" – with "Death of Nature" echoes of de-humanization and hostility to the Scientific Revolution (which knew nothing of materialism!), also a powerful Christian theme in Cudworth, Clarke and beyond. Here I challenge this view, by examining some "moments' of radical Enlightenment materialism such as La Mettrie and Diderot (including his Encyclopédie entry "Spinosiste"), but also anonymous, clandestine texts such as L"Âme Matérielle, to emphasize their distinctive focus on the specific existence of organic beings. Second, I show how this "embodied", non-mechanistic character of Enlightenment "vital materialism" makes it different from other episodes, and perhaps more of an ethics than is usually thought (also via the figure of the materialist as "laughing philosopher"). Third, I reflect on what this implies for our image of the Enlightenment – no longer a Frankfurt School and/or Foucaldian vision of "discipline", regimentation and order – but "vital", without, conversely, being a kind of holist vitalism some scholars seek to oppose to materialism: vital materialism is still materialism. Its ethics tends towards hedonism, but its most radical proponents (Diderot, La Mettrie and later Sade) disagree as to what this means.

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-24820-2_5

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