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(1999) Consciousness and intentionality, Dordrecht, Springer.
What sort of an episode is perception? What are the objects of such episodes? What is the grammatical and logical form of perceptual reports, direct and indirect? Each of these questions has been the subject of recent discussion. In what follows I set out one answer to each of them and explore some of the ways these answers support and complement each other. The answers adopted are: to perceive — and I shall normally only have in mind visual perception — is not to judge or to conceptualize but a sui generis mental mode or activity involving non-conceptual content; perception is of particulars only; the complements of perceptual verbs are, with one exception, non-propositional and indirect perceptual reports are made true by direct perceptual relations between subjects and particulars of various sorts.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-015-9193-5_8
Full citation:
Mulligan, K. (1999)., Perception, particulars and predicates, in D. Fisette (ed.), Consciousness and intentionality, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 163-194.
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