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(1997) Issues and images in the philosophy of science, Dordrecht, Springer.
Cognitive dynamics and the development of science
William. E. Herfel , Clifford A. Hooker
pp. 127-172
Professor Polikarov has spent considerable time surveying various dimensions of the science-technology process, and scientific method in particular (Polikarov 1973; 1983). Therein he has expressed a view which has radical implications vis-a-vis traditional philosophy, namely that philosophy of science should itself be considered an extension of the science-technology process, and in this precise sense: Philosophy of science is a more general theory of human cognitive processes than is any particular science and methodologically it stands to the sciences as its domain of phenomena in just the way that a particular scientific theory stands to its domain of phenomena. This view issues in the general naturalist program to understand the world as a natural unity and hence to see knowledge as a natural phenomenon within it. This is a radical enough program philosophically, but the naturalist program further requires seeing the science-technology process and our epistemological understanding of it as a single dynamic system, mutually interactive and with a distinctive historical development.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-011-5788-9_9
Full citation:
Herfel, W. E. , Hooker, C. A. (1997)., Cognitive dynamics and the development of science, in D. Ginev & R. S. Cohen (eds.), Issues and images in the philosophy of science, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 127-172.
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