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Guilt

Calum Neill

pp. 75-89

Lacan's dictum that "the only thing of which one can be guilty is of having given ground relative to one's desire' (Lacan, 1992: 319) raises a number of interpretative problems. Any considered reading of this statement would have to account not only for the precise meaning of the dual terms "desire' and "guilt' but, crucially, for how these two terms might interrelate, that is, what might be meant by "having given ground relative to'.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1057/9780230305038_5

Full citation:

Neill, C. (2011). Guilt, in Lacanian ethics and the assumption of subjectivity, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 75-89.

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