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(2016) Epistemology, knowledge and the impact of interaction, Dordrecht, Springer.
How account for the intuitive difference between simply knowing a necessary proposition, and knowing that it is a necessary truth? In the paper it will be shown that two-dimensional semantics does not do the job in an adequate way. A solution is provided which is based on Hintikka's worldlines. Assuming a slight extension of the syntax, modal epistemic logic can thus deal with classical puzzles like knowledge of identities.
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Full citation:
Rebuschi, M. (2016)., Knowing necessary truths, in J. Redmond, O. Martins & Ã. Fernández (eds.), Epistemology, knowledge and the impact of interaction, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 269-282.
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