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(2014) Virtue epistemology naturalized, Dordrecht, Springer.
In a number of recent pieces, Duncan Pritchard has used cases with the structure of Goldman's infamous fake barn case to argue against (i) a promising virtue epistemological account of knowledge and (ii) a promising knowledge-based account of understanding. This paper aims to defend both of these views against Pritchard's objections. More specifically, I outline two ways of resisting Pritchard's objections. The first allows for knowledge in fake barn cases and explains the intuition of ignorance away. In contrast, the second response appeals to a plausible alternative account of understanding. Each of the resulting views is shown to be epistemologically viable and preferable to the alternative Pritchard's offers.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-04672-3_20
Full citation:
Kelp, C. (2014)., Knowledge, understanding and virtue, in A. Fairweather (ed.), Virtue epistemology naturalized, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 347-360.
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