(2017) Representation and reality in humans, other living organisms and intelligent machines, Dordrecht, Springer.
Life is precious because it is precarious
individuality, mortality and the problem of meaning
Computationalism aspires to provide a comprehensive theory of life and mind. It fails in this task because it lacks the conceptual tools to address the problem of meaning. I argue that a meaningful perspective is enacted by an individual with a potential that is intrinsic to biological existence: death. Life matters to such an individual because it must constantly create the conditions of its own existence, which is unique and irreplaceable. For that individual to actively adapt, rather than to passively disintegrate, expresses a value inherent in its way of life, which is the ultimate source of more refined forms of normativity. This response to the problem of meaning will not satisfy those searching for a functionalist or logical solution, but on this view such a solution will not be forthcoming. As an intuition pump for this alternative perspective I introduce two ancient foreign worldviews that assign a constitutive role to death. Then I trace the emergence of a similar conception of mortality from the cybernetics era to the ongoing development of enactive cognitive science. Finally, I analyze why orthodox computationalism has failed to grasp the role of mortality in this constitutive way.
Froese, T. (2017)., Life is precious because it is precarious: individuality, mortality and the problem of meaning, in G. Dodig Crnkovic & R. Giovagnoli (eds.), Representation and reality in humans, other living organisms and intelligent machines, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 33-50.
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