Three types of heterotropic intentionality
a taxonomy in social ontology
I will focus on the phenomenon of heterotropic intentionality, on its role in the creation of social reality and on its relation to social ontology. I will argue five theses on heterotropic intentionality: (i) the heterotropism thesis identifies a great divide within the vast domain of intentional phenomena: solitary ones (which need just one individual in order to exist) vs. heterotropic ones (which need at least two individuals in order to exist); (ii) the three-types-of-heterotropic-intentionality thesis maintains that there are at least three types of heterotropic intentionality: collective, intersubjective and social intentionality; (iii) the three-modes-of-intersubjective-and-collective-intentionality thesis claims that, like solitary or individual intentionality, collective and social intentionality also involve different modes of intentionality: practical, affective and cognitive; (iv) the sub-personal-and-personal-level thesis maintains that collective and intersubjective intentionality are both sub-personal and personal intentionality, while social intentionality is always a personal intentionality; (v) the ontological-efficacy thesis claims that all three types of heterotropic intentionality create social entities, and that social entities are ontologically dependent on heterotropic intentionality, and not on solitary or individual intentionality. Moreover, I will integrate my theses by putting forward a taxonomy which points out the family resemblances and the strong diversities of these types of heterotropic intentionality.
De Vecchi, F. (2014)., Three types of heterotropic intentionality: a taxonomy in social ontology, in A. Konzelmann-Ziv & H. B. Schmid (eds.), Institutions, emotions, and group agents, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 117-137.
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