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A reply to a critic of my refutation of logical psychologism

Edmund Husserl

pp. 33-42

One does not need to read very far in this work to see that its content deviates fundamentally from its title. Namely, it does not really give a general treatment of the quarrel between the psychologistic and the formalistic logicians. Rather, it deals only with my quarrel with Psychologism in my Logische Untersuchungen, which appeared in 1900. It is the author's intent to oppose the "formalistic tendency in modern logic" (p. 5), the "precipitous, retrograde movement which writes on its banner the war cry — "Away from psychology'"! He will oppose the "formalistic danger" of an "unfruitful and sterile formalism" (p. 1). Thus he puts his task quite generally, in his "Introduction." But then, as we proceed, we immediately hear also that Bolzano is to be regarded as "the true originator of modern formalism in logic"; and we are reminded that Husserl is, so far, the only modern logician who has linked his positions to Bolzano's Wissenschaftslehre in essential points. Then we further notice that the author mentions no other formalists. Rather, his attacks — some in particular chapters, and some in the form of sorties interspersed throughout the text — relate solely and only to Husserl. So we must, so far as this work is concerned, form the equation: Modern Formalists = Husserl. If, now, the malice in the tone preferred by the author does not suffice to keep me form complying with the kind invitation of the editor of this journal to review this work, it is in order that I might fulfill the obligation, which every serious worker has, not to let his work fall victim to attacks that would distort it.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-010-1055-9_4

Full citation [Harvard style]:

Husserl, E. (1977)., A reply to a critic of my refutation of logical psychologism, in J. N. Mohanty (ed.), Readings on Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations, Den Haag, Nijhoff, pp. 33-42.

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