Fichte, Kant, the cognitive subject, and epistemic constructivism
This paper will consider the nature and explanatory limits of the Fichtean view of subjectivity in the epistemic context of German idealism. I will argue that Fichte’s revision of the Kantian conception of the subject is both a basic contribution to the cognitive problem as well as fatally flawed, hence not a viable solution to the cognitive problem. Fichte’s distinctive revision of the Kantian subject goes too far in making the objective overly, even wholly dependent on the subjective dimension. After Kant and after Fichte we still lack an effective solution for the problem of cognition.
Full citation [Harvard style]:
Rockmore, T. (2016). Fichte, Kant, the cognitive subject, and epistemic constructivism. Revista de estud(i)os sobre Fichte 12, pp. n/a.
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