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(2014) Rivista di estetica 56.
In Speech Acts, John Searle argues that institutional facts presuppose, for their existence, the existence of certain institutions (understood as systems of constitutive rules). In this paper I extend Searle’s theory of institutional facts arguing that a further level is needed for the investigation of the structure of institutional reality: the level of meta-institutional concepts. The meta-institutional concepts are concepts that go beyond (Greek: metá) the institutions of which they are conditions of possibility. An example of meta-institutional concept is the concept of game. In a culture which does not have the concept of game, we could move the chess-men according to the rules of chess, we could also perform a castling, but it would be impossible to play chess.
Publication details
DOI: 10.4000/estetica.876
Full citation:
Lorini, G. (2014). Meta-institutional concepts: a new category for social ontology. Rivista di estetica 56, pp. 127-139.
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