Judgment and practice in Reid and Wittgenstein

Patrick Rysiew

This paper considers the views of two figures whose work falls on either side of the heyday of American pragmatism, Thomas Reid (1710-96) and Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889-1951). The broad similarities between Reid’s and (the later) Wittgenstein’s views, and in particular their epistemological views, has been well documented. Here, I argue that such similarities extend to the relation in their work between common sense and the presence of elements in their thought that can be considered pragmatist in some important respect.

Publication details

DOI: 10.4000/ejpap.1042

Full citation:

Rysiew, P. (2017). Judgment and practice in Reid and Wittgenstein. European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 9 (2), pp. n/a.

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