Anti-psychologism and neutrality

the radical empiricism of Husserl and James

Roberta Lanfredini

Both the phenomenology of Husserl and the pragmatist phenomenology of James can be categorized by the formula “radical empiricism,” which is explicit in James and implicit, but no less pervasive, in Husserl. For both of them, radical empiricism is additionally conjoined with an equally radical anti-psychologism. The problem is that the two terms “radical empiricism” and “anti-psychologism” take on a radically different meaning in the two authors. This essay aims to investigate the structural differences between two perspectives that, while following completely different courses, seem to share the same objective: to elaborate a philosophy which at no point moves away from the experiential plane.

Publication details

DOI: 10.4000/ejpap.999

Full citation [Harvard style]:

Lanfredini, R. (2017). Anti-psychologism and neutrality: the radical empiricism of Husserl and James. European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy 9 (1), pp. n/a.

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