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(1982) Husserl's "Introductions to phenomenology", Dordrecht, Springer.
Husserl's thesis that consciousness is world-constitutive and its demonstration
William R McKenna
pp. 6-17
The thesis that consciousness constitutes the world is the thesis that the being there (Dasein) for us of the world and of anything that is in it is an achievement (Leistung) of consciousness. This thesis is not the seemingly obvious one that I must "be conscious," that is, be awake, for the world to be given to me.1 Such a thesis would consider consciousness to be a state or condition which I must be in so that what is there all along and on its own can become manifest to me Becoming conscious in this sense is like experiencing the lighting of a dark room, and like the phenomenon of light, consciousness can be thought to be a transparent and homogeneous medium which allows the existence as well as the true structures and qualities of objects to be revealed to me — but precisely by being itself unstructured and without qualities.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-7573-6_2
Full citation:
McKenna, W.R. (1982). Husserl's thesis that consciousness is world-constitutive and its demonstration, in Husserl's "Introductions to phenomenology", Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 6-17.
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