Repository | Book | Chapter

142042

(1991) Appearance and sense, Dordrecht-Boston-London, Kluwer.

Object, positum, concept

Gustav Špet

pp. 97-121

The dissatisfaction and discontent observed in contemporary philosophy concerning knowledge expressed in terms of and by means of concepts springs chiefly from the fact that concepts, as a means of cognizing, appear to be determinate. Consequently, that is, they appear as limited. This is not a contingency, a temporary deficiency. It is our only, and so necessary, way of making a concept "logical."

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-011-3292-3_6

Full citation:

Špet, G. (1991). Object, positum, concept, in Appearance and sense, Dordrecht-Boston-London, Kluwer, pp. 97-121.

This document is unfortunately not available for download at the moment.