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(1991) Appearance and sense, Dordrecht-Boston-London, Kluwer.

Experiencing and ideal intuition

Gustav Špet

pp. 9-23

Thus based on what we have just said one of the first tasks before philosophy is the problem concerning the foundation upon which the entire structure of our knowledge, both philosophical and scientific, both that of actuality as well as that of the "ideal world" can be erected. "Philosophy, however, is essentially a science of true beginnings, or origins, of rizomata panton"1 Consequently, it is necessary in philosophy to concern oneself with finding foundations, "beginnings." By its very idea and vocation "first" philosophy speaks of just such beginnings and principles. Whereas, however, the initial assertion of positive philosophy was an acknowledgment that the "fundamental" philosophical science must be a science of the foundations of everything existing, consequently of being itself, negative philosophy treated this fundamental thesis in a negative manner. In its pseudo-affirmation, viz. sophistry, it saw as the task of "first" philosophy not the study of cognizable being but of the cognizing subject itself, yet again not in its being, as a cognizing subject, but only in its cognitive forms. Precisely herein lies the principal sin of sophistry and the "theory of knowledge."a Psychologism is only a particular expression of this fundamental shortcoming of negative philosophy. It is evident that the "theory of knowledge" in the mentioned philosophical sense essentially cannot free itself from this shortcoming, since psychologism is part of its very essence.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/978-94-011-3292-3_2

Full citation:

Špet, G. (1991). Experiencing and ideal intuition, in Appearance and sense, Dordrecht-Boston-London, Kluwer, pp. 9-23.

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