Different concepts of logic and their relation to subjectivity
In secondary literature, Husserl's Prolegomena to Pure Logic 1 has aroused surprisingly little attention. Several circumstances might be responsible for this inattention, the first being that the problem of psychologism is considered to be resolved. With this in mind, it no longer seems worth the effort to reconstruct Husserl's meandering and repetitive lines of argument. The fact that the text of the Prolegomena essentially stems from a lecture delivered in 1896 is another reason to turn directly to the more mature discussions regarding the relation of pure logic and phenomenology in the Second Volume of the Logical Investigations.2 Finally to some readers, Husserl's extensive discussion of literature contemporary to him seems dated and irrelevant. This is supported by the work of merited scholars, such as Dallas Willard,3 which has shown that one cannot always trust Husserl's presentation of opposing positions.
Full citation [Harvard style]:
Bernet, R. (2002)., Different concepts of logic and their relation to subjectivity, in D. Zahavi & F. Stjernfelt (eds.), One hundred years of phenomenology, Dordrecht, Kluwer, pp. 19-29.
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