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(2006) Intersubjective temporality, Dordrecht, Springer.

The appresentation of perceived objects

Lanei Rodemeyer

pp. 47-57

In his Husserl und die transzendentale Intersubjektivität87, Dan Zahavi wishes to defend phenomenology against accusations of solipsism, and he takes his cue from linguistics. Zahavi's approach is actually two-fold: First, he executes a careful analysis of Husserl's phenomenology, integrating Husserl's later texts and developments into a more traditional understanding of phenomenology and introducing his own interpretation of these developments; second, Zahavi argues that philosophers of language, especially Habermas and Apel, have based their criticisms of phenomenology upon a crucial misinterpretation. This misinterpretation says that phenomenology's focus upon the subject is ultimately fatal, because it neglects the integral intersubjective nature of a subject's development and language. Zahavi argues not only that phenomenology is open to intersubjectivity but also that it provides analyses key to Habermas' and Apel's own projects and goals:

Publication details

DOI: 10.1007/1-4020-4214-0_2

Full citation:

Rodemeyer, L. (2006). The appresentation of perceived objects, in Intersubjective temporality, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 47-57.

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