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(1990) Husserlian intentionality and non-foundational realism, Dordrecht, Kluwer.
Husserl has said in both editions of LU that acts with a common matter intend the same objectivity. In speaking of this intentional objectivity, Husserl tells us, we are not concerned with the sense in which we speak of its "being;" we are unconcerned, that is, with whether the intentional object is real or ideal, actual (wahrhaft), possible or impossible (LU II/1, 427 [II, 587]). It is this indifference to the mode of the object's existence which becomes prominent in Husserl's later theory of the phenomenological reduction.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/978-94-009-1974-7_4
Full citation:
Drummond, J. (1990). The reduction, in Husserlian intentionality and non-foundational realism, Dordrecht, Kluwer, pp. 46-59.
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