The aporia of time-analysis—reflection across the transcendental divide
The presentation of the phenomenological analysis of temporality that has been taken as the standard, Edmund Husserl's The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness, is, as everyone knows, not Husserl's full word on the subject, but really only the first of the three distinct series of studies he produced on the topic. Curiously, therefore, and paradoxically, while this standard treatment is taken as authoritative, it is recognized at the same time as only a first-state, first-level treatment that has been awaiting its further deepening and critical interpretation ever since its publication in 1928. True, portions of the work Husserl did in his second set of studies, the Bernau manuscripts of 1917–1918, were incorporated into the texts published in 1928;1 but both the Bernau set and the C-series remain to this day unedited and unpublished as a whole. The result is that, largely speaking, the thematic thrust of Husserl's work through the second and third stage manuscripts is still only partially explicated. Individual papers by Rudolf Bernet have critical explications of Husserl's classic analysis,2 and Klaus Held has done a fine job in his study of the C-series in his Lebendige Gegenwart; 3 but a full systematic interpretation of Husserl's work through the three stages, in terms of the issues that drove his analyses and the conditions that either allow his work to succeed or hold it to inadequacy and limitation, this has not yet been adequately attempted.
Bruzina, R. (1999)., The aporia of time-analysis—reflection across the transcendental divide, in B. C. Hopkins (ed.), Phenomenology, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 105-132.
This document is unfortunately not available for download at the moment.