Investigating the nature of the phenomenological reduction to phenomena and the limits of Husserl's transcendental phenomenology, this article pleads in favor of an interrogative, intuitive, and world-oriented style of phenomenological research. Such a phenomenology is required by phenomena that do not lend themselves to an analysis in terms of a constituting transcendental ego and of an eidetic science directed at the apodictically necessary structures of a pure consciousness. The phenomenological method must thus allow, besides a transcendental and eidetic phenomenological science, for a quasi-empirical phenomenology of events and historical traditions.
Full citation [Harvard style]:
Bernet, R. (2015)., Transcendental phenomenology?, in J. Bloechl & N. De Warren (eds.), Phenomenology in a new key, Dordrecht, Springer, pp. 115-133.
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