Where is the phenomenology of attention that Husserl intended to perform?

a transcendental pragmatic-oriented description of attention

Natalie Depraz

pp. 5-20

For the most part, attention occurs as a theme adjacent to much more topical and innovatingly operating acts: first, the intentional act, which represents a destitution of the abstract opposition between subject and object and which paves the way for a detailed analysis of our perceptive horizontal subjective life; second, the reductive act, specified in a psycho-phenomenological sense as a reflective conversion of the way I am looking at things; third, the genetic method understood as a genealogy of logic based on our experiential affective pre-discursive world-life. In this respect, here are some of the leading questions of my investigation: What are the differences and the proximities between these methods and attentional activity? Why is the latter not put to the fore as a method? To what extent is this secondary part played by attention linked to the constitution of phenomenology as opposed to psychology (for which attention is a central theme), and what does it mean for the impossibility of phenomenology to freeing itself completely from psychology?

Publication details

DOI: 10.1023/B:MAWO.0000049309.87813.f7

Full citation [Harvard style]:

Depraz, N. (2004). Where is the phenomenology of attention that Husserl intended to perform?: a transcendental pragmatic-oriented description of attention. Continental Philosophy Review 37 (1), pp. 5-20.

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