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(2005) Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3).
Philosophy and Neuroscienceis an unabashed apologetic for reductionism in the philosophy of mind. Although we have learnt much from Bickle's work, we find his central claims unconvincing. Our comments have two central foci:Bickle's account of mental causation, and his single-cell account of consciousness. We argue that Bickle's attempt to solve the problem of mental causation is marred by his refusal to take multiple realizability seriously, and we suggest that his faith in single cell accounts of consciousness is misplaced. We remain unconvinced that the solutions to the problems of mental causation and consciousness are to be found in neuroscience.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11097-005-4073-3
Full citation:
Bayne, T. , Fernández, J. (2005). Resisting ruthless reductionism: a comment on Bickle. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 4 (3), pp. 239-248.
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