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(2006) Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (3-4).
Perception and action
on the praxial structure of intentional consciousness
Panos Theodorou
pp. 303-320
Progressively Husserl started referring to the whole sphere of the life of intentional acts in terms of praxis. Perception, imagination, judgement, scientific consciousness, etc., are all seen as practices. What is the meaning of this move? A seemingly self-evident possibility is that intentionality is praxial, because even perception is not completely free from empty intending moments that demand fulfilment; and all fulfilment is attained by means of bodily activities that enable our senses to acquire the relevant contents. I reject this approach as insufficient and misguided. I argue that perception and intentionality in general is praxial because consciousness, in all of its constituting syntheses, is or becomes organized as a practice-structure. Intentional consciousness organizes its contents according to rules so as to accomplish the evident or true givenness of its intended correlates.
Publication details
DOI: 10.1007/s11097-006-9019-x
Full citation:
Theodorou, P. (2006). Perception and action: on the praxial structure of intentional consciousness. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 5 (3-4), pp. 303-320.
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