(2000) Husserl Studies 17 (1).

Practical intentionality and transcendental phenomenology as a practical philosophy

Nam-In Lee

pp. 49-63

This paper will deal with the problem of practical intentionality in the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl. First, through an analysis of a passage found in Logical Investigations, I will show Husserl's earlier position with respect to the problem of practical intentionality. I will then go on to critically assess this position and, with reference to some of Husserl's works written after the 1920's, prove that every intentionality should be regarded as a practical intentionality. Correspondingly, transcendental phenomenology should also be characterized as a practical philosophy. I make this statement with the following two senses in mind; transcendental phenomenology is a practical philosophy, first, in the sense that it investigates the various forms of practical intentionality and, second, in the sense that transcendental intentionality as the grounding source of transcendental phenomenology is also a kind of practical intentionality.

Publication details

DOI: 10.1023/A:1006486732354

Full citation [Harvard style]:

Lee, N.-I. (2000). Practical intentionality and transcendental phenomenology as a practical philosophy. Husserl Studies 17 (1), pp. 49-63.

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